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ABSTRACT
We note a fact which is simple, but may be useful for the
networking research community: essentially any change
to BGP’s decision process can cause divergence — or
convergence when BGP would otherwise diverge.
1. INTRODUCTION
The Internet’s interdomain routing protocol, BGP [3],
uses a decision process to select a single best route to
each destination when presented with multiple options.
This decision process can be customized and modified
at each router to select routes that achieve various ob-
jectives such as load balance, path quality, or security.
When proposing such a modification, we were asked a
very natural question: Given the known problem that
a distributed network of BGP routers might never con-
verge to a stable state [5], might the proposed change
make the problem worse? That is, do there exist cases
in which the standard BGP protocol converges, but the
proposed modification causes divergence?
The Hippocratic goal to do no harm is natural to
desire of any modification to BGP’s decision process,
given its global importance. However, we observe here
that any modification to the decision process can cause
divergence in some case when standard BGP would con-
verge, under very mild conditions. Specifically, (1) the
modified BGP must actually differ, in that there is some
case where the modified and standard BGP both con-
verge, but to different outcomes; and (2) the modifica-
tion either may be deployed at only some routers, or the
modification preserves the expressiveness of standard
BGP (for example by maintaining the initial operator-
configurable LOCAL PREF step). Even seemingly triv-
ial changes, like changing a tiebreaking step from “low-
est router ID” to “highest router ID”, satisfy these con-
ditions and therefore may cause divergence.
But this fact should not incite fear of modifying BGP.
Indeed, any modification could also cause convergence
when BGP would otherwise diverge. Thus, fear of mod-
ifying BGP can be equally matched with fear of not
modifying BGP.
Instead, what the result points out is that the ques-
tion of whether new cases of divergence could happen
by switching from decision process A to B is uninforma-
tive, because the answer is always “yes” for any distinct
values of A and B. A more valuable question is how con-
vergence is affected in realistic cases. This, of course, is
a much more difficult question to answer convincingly,
not least because it requires assumptions about what is
realistic.
2. MODEL
2.1 The standard model
We follow the model of [1].1 An instance of the Stable
Paths Problem (SPP) consists of a graph G = (V,E)
and a set λ of ranking functions, one for each node
v ∈ V . Node v’s ranking function λv specifies which
paths v prefers; specifically, if λv(P1) > λv(P2) then v
prefers P1 over P2. We require that λv(P1) 6= λv(P2)
unless P1 and P2 have the same first edge (since BGP
learns only a single route from each neighbor, we will
never need to compare two such routes).
The “null path” ε represents the absence of a path to
the destination, and is considered a valid path. Since
BGP’s decision process may eliminate a path P due to
import or export filters, we may have λv(ε) > λv(P ).
We write P1P2 to denote the concatenation of two paths,
or vwP to concatenate the edge (v, w) with path P .
There is a single distinguished node 0 to which all
nodes are choosing paths. At any given time t, each
node v has a current path assignment pit(v). At all
times t, we have pit(0) = 0 (i.e., the destination always
selects the trivial one-hop path to itself). The dynam-
ics of the protocol are modeled by a sequence of “acti-
vations” of nodes A = (vi1 , vi2 , . . .) in which each node
(other than 0) must appear infinitely often. At time t,
only node At updates its selected route pit(At) and all
other nodes are unaffected. Specifically, if v = At, then
v chooses its new best route by setting
pit(v) = argmaxP∈choices(v,t)λv(P ), (1)
1We omit [1]’s FIFO queues and permitted path sets, which
other features of the model can emulate.
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where choices(v, t) is the set of all simple (non-loopy)
paths of the form vwpit(w) where w is a neighbor of v
and pit(w) is w’s current path.
A node v is stable in path assignment pi if execut-
ing (1) produces no change. A path assignment pi is
stable if all nodes are stable in pi. An instance (G,λ)
is safe if any activation sequence eventually produces
a stable path assignment, regardless of the initial path
assignment.
2.2 Modeling a modified decision process
A ranking function λ encapsulates the final result of
the BGP decision process, whether that is due to an
operator’s assignment of the LOCAL PREF attribute
for a route, or minimizing the AS PATH length, or any
of the various other factors that affect the decision pro-
cess. So a “modified BGP decision process” is simply a
different ranking function λ′.
But two ranking functions might be effectively equiv-
alent, in that they produce the same outcome in prac-
tice. The following definition rules out such degenerate
modifications.
Definition 1. Two ranking functions λ, λ′ are safely
distinct if there exists a network N for which (N,λ)
and (N,λ′) are safe, but their stable states differ.
(Note that since the two instances are safe, they each
have a single stable state [2,4].) As mentioned in the in-
troduction, this definition restricts our attention to the
case that there is some network on which λ and λ′ are
safe and converge to different outcomes. While this ap-
pears to be a very mild restriction, it is conceivable that
λ and λ′ always produce identical stable states except
on networks where at least one of them may diverge. In
that case, reasoning about differences in outcomes in-
volves the system’s dynamics, i.e., particular activation
sequences. It would be possible to use our technique to
make statements about particular activation sequences,
but we choose to avoid that complication here.
3. PRECARIOUSNESS
3.1 Partial deployment
In this section we show that any safely distinct mod-
ification of the BGP decision process can cause diver-
gence or convergence, when partially deployed.
But what exactly is a “partial deployment” of the
modified decision process? Since a ranking function is
defined for a specific network, how can we “deploy” it
in a new environment where it may have to rank new
paths? Fortunately we can sidestep this modeling com-
plication since we will need to use the ranking functions
in only a black-box manner in our theorem.
Specifically, suppose we have ranking functions λN
and λG on networks N and G, respectively, and a given
subgraph N ′ ⊆ G is identical to N . Then a partial
deployment of λN in (G,λG) is an instance (G,λ∗)
where
λ∗v(P ) =
 λ
G
v (P ) if v ∈ G \N ′
λNv (P ) if v ∈ N ′ and P ⊆ N ′
−∞ if v ∈ N ′ and P 6⊆ N ′.
In other words, the new ranking function λ∗ mimics
λG except on N ′ where it mimics λN . The third case
causes λ∗ to rank any path outside N ′ strictly less than
ε, which ensures that λN never is called upon to rank a
path outside the network N ′ on which it is well-defined.
This models a scenario in which nodes outsideN ′ export
no BGP route advertisements to nodes in N ′.
We can now state and prove the theorem.
Theorem 1. If λ and λ′ are safely distinct, then there
exists an SPP instance (G,λG) in which a partial de-
ployment of λ is safe, but a partial deployment of λ′ has
no stable path assignment.
One can interpret the theorem as follows. If we let
λ be the behavior of standard BGP, then the partial
deployment of λ in (G,λG) just means that the whole
network runs standard BGP, and the modification λ′
causes divergence. Symmetrically, we can just as easily
let λ′ be the behavior of standard BGP, in which case
the modification causes convergence.
Proof. We construct G as follows (Fig. 1). Since
λ and λ′ are safely distinct, there is a network N on
which their stable states differ. We include in G two
copies of N which we call N and N ′, but with only one
instance of the destination 0. By the condition of the
theorem, there must exist a w ∈ N which has differing
path selections in the stable states of (N,λ) and (N,λ′).
Let w′ be the corresponding node in N ′. We add a new
node x connected to w and w′. Finally, we add an
“oscillator gadget” — a triangle a, b, c with each node
connected to the destination 0 — and connect a to x.
We construct λG as follows. First, λGv = λv for all
v ∈ N . The behavior of λG on N ′ is irrelevant, since
this is where we will place the partial deployment of λ
or λ′.
Second, λGx ranks paths as follows. Let P1, . . . , Pk be
a list of all w ; 0 paths in N , and let P ′1, . . . , P
′
k be the
corresponding w′ ; 0 paths in N ′. Without loss of gen-
erality, suppose that P1 is w’s selected path in the stable
state of (N,λ′), while w’s selected path in (N,λ) is some
other path Pi. Then we let λ
G
x (xwP1) > λ
G
x (xw
′P ′1) >
λGx (xwP2) > λ
G
x (xw
′P ′2) > . . . > λ
G
x (xwPk) > λ
G
x (xw
′P ′k)
> ε, with all other paths ranked below ε.
Third and finally, on the oscillator gadget, λG be-
haves like the classic Bad Gadget [1]: each of a, b, c will
accept one of two paths, the direct path (e.g. a0) and
the path via its counterclockwise neighbor (e.g. ab0),
with the latter preferred. However, to this structure we
add the fact that a most prefers the path axwPi.
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Figure 1: An SPP instance which converges if and only
if N and N ′ have the same stable state. The ranking
function of certain nodes is written in blue next to the
node, listing paths from most to least preferred. Multi-
ple copies of the destination 0 are drawn for clarity, but
these are in fact the same node.
With a partial deployment of λ on N ′, the effect of
the construction is as follows. Since (N,λ) is safe, it
must have a single stable state [2, 4], so N and N ′ will
eventually stabilize with corresponding path selections
Pi and P
′
i . Therefore, since x always prefers a path in
N over the corresponding path in N ′, it will eventu-
ally select xwPi permanently, causing a to select the
path axwPi, causing c to select c0, and b to select bc0.
Thus, a unique stable state is reached for any activation
sequence.
On the other hand, consider a partial deployment of
λ′ on N ′. Since (N ′, λ′) is safe it must have a single
stable state [2], which we know must differ from the
stable state of (N,λ). Thus, after N and N ′ converge,
node x is presented with two different paths, xwPi and
xw′P ′1. It will prefer the path xw
′P ′1 and remain with
that selection thereafter. With a’s possibility of any
more-preferred path via x now eliminated, the nodes
a, b, c mimic the Bad Gadget, and have no stable state.
Therefore, with a partial deployment of λ′, this instance
has no stable state.
3.2 Full deployment
If the requirement of partial deployment were removed,
Theorem 1 would no longer hold. Consider, for exam-
ple, a modified decision process which simply performs
shortest path routing. The theorem shows that a partial
deployment of shortest path routing can cause diver-
gence; however, a full deployment will always converge.
But the theorem holds with full deployments if we
add a constraint on the modification: it must preserve
the expressive power of BGP. One way to formalize this
is as follows. The operator of each node v specifies a
partial ranking function λˆv which may assign multi-
ple paths the same value. A decision process is now
a function d which, given a partial ranking function λˆv,
returns a ranking function dλˆv consistent with λˆv (that
is, λˆv(P1) > λˆv(P2) implies dλˆv (P1) > dλˆv (P2)). In-
tuitively, d breaks any “ties” in λˆ’s ranking of paths.2
We let dλˆ refer to the set of ranking functions produced
by applying d to the set of partial ranking functions λˆv
over all nodes v.
Taking common ISP business relationships as an ex-
ample, an operator might specify λˆv(P ) = 100 for paths
through v’s providers, λˆv(P ) = 200 for paths through
peers, and λˆv(P ) = 300 for paths through customers. If
v has multiple providers, peers, or customers, this will
not always yield a unique best path; the decision process
d breaks those ties, perhaps by examining path length
or other factors. However, the operator can choose to
specify an arbitrary ranking function by giving λˆv(P ) a
distinct value for each P (in which case d does not af-
fect the outcome). In this sense, any modified decision
process preserves BGP’s expressiveness.
We can now show a theorem analogous to Theorem 1
without the partial deployment requirement. The proof
is an easy adaptation of our earlier technique: since the
partial ranking function can be used to force any total
order, we can build the necessary ranking functions even
though the modification is deployed at all nodes.
Definition 2. Two decision processes d, d′ are safely
distinct if there exists a network N and partial ranking
functions λˆ for which (N, dλˆ) and (N, d
′
λˆ
) are safe, but
their stable states differ.
Theorem 2. If d and d′ are safely distinct, then there
exists a network G and partial ranking functions λˆG in
which (G, dλˆG) is safe, but (G, d
′
λˆG
) has no stable path
assignment.
Proof. LetN and λˆ be such that (N, dλˆ) and (N, d
′
λˆ
)
are safe, but their stable states differ. We construct G
based on N as in the proof of Theorem 1. Let λGv be
the ranking functions constructed in the proof of The-
orem 1 with λ = dλˆ and λ
′ = d′
λˆ
. Define the partial
ranking functions λˆG as
λˆGv =

λGv if v ∈ {x, a, b, c}
dλˆv if v ∈ N
λˆv if v ∈ N ′.
Note that applying one of the decision processes to λˆG
can only vary its behavior for v ∈ N ′. With this con-
struction, applying the decision process d yields ranking
functions dλˆG which are exactly equivalent to λ
G with
a partial deployment of dλˆ on N
′. Likewise, d′
λˆG
is ex-
actly equivalent to λG with a partial deployment of d′
λˆ
on N ′. Therefore, the result follows by the argument of
the proof of Theorem 1.
2Recall from the definition of a ranking function that dλˆv
might still have ties, but only between two routes that go
through the same neighbor, which we never need to compare.
3
4. EXTENSIONS
Our results dealt with decision processes which differ
in their final stable state. One can also show that if
there is any difference in path selections in two rank-
ing functions λ and λ′ at any moment during the dy-
namic convergence process, then for a particular acti-
vation sequence, a partial deployment of λ′ will diverge
while a partial deployment of λ will converge (or vice
versa). This involves inserting a gadget (essentially Dis-
agree [1]) between x and a in the construction of Fig. 1,
to “remember” that some difference has occurred in the
past. In one sense, this is stronger than our previous re-
sults, as it applies even to transient differences between
λ and λ′. However, it is less satisfying since it needs
an activation sequence that runs N and N ′ in lockstep.
With any variation in timing, even two copies of λ could
be judged to be different at some moments in time.
One could consider more general models of the BGP
decision process, perhaps treating it as a state machine
with memory, in order to model features such as route
flap damping [6] which change their preferences across
time. Since our theorems use λ and λ′ essentially as
black boxes, such extensions may be straightforward.
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